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FRASER v. MLS, L.L. C.: IS THERE A
SHAM EXCEPTION TO THE
COPPERWELD SINGLE
ENTITY IMMUNITY?
MICHAEL P. WAXMAN*
"Sports law" is an amalgamation of a diverse collection of legal sub-
ject areas.' Judicial decisions often consider the special nature of sports
when they apply these areas of law to cases addressing the sports indus-
try.' However, "sports law" decisions affect these various legal subject
areas well beyond the "sports law" context. This is particularly true in
antitrust law.
In Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C.,3 the United States District
Court for Massachusetts addressed several aspects of antitrust law as
they relate to professional sports leagues. A particular issue the Fraser
court considered and resolved was whether "single entity" immunity4
from section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act5 (Sherman Act) was
available to Major League Soccer (MLS), a limited liability company6
that is primarily composed of a professional soccer league and its constit-
uent investor-operators. In response to MLS's claim of single entity im-
* Professor, Marquette University Law School. B.S., Cornell University; J.D., Boston
College, of counsel, Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. Timothy J. Davis, What Is Sports Law?, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. Rv. 211 (2001).
2. See, e.g, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
3. 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2000).
4. For an explanation of the single entity immunity, see infra § I, 1. Although the plain-
tiffs in Fraser refer to the single entity defense, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 131, this article will use the
term immunity because it, rather than defense, properly describes the legal context of the
decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The Cop-
perweld decision presumes that being a single entity makes that entity immune from enforce-
ment of section one of the Sherman Act because the Act's coverage addresses only acts
through combinations, conspiracies, and contracts. Therefore, because acts by a single entity
cannot be greater than that provided by Congress, the actor and its acts would be immune
from the reach of section one. Conversely, if Copperweld only granted an affirmative defense,
the defendant could waive the defense affirmatively or by omission.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
6. A limited liability company is a modem business entity that is a hybrid made up of the
limited liability of a corporation, the tax benefits of a partnership and the managerial opera-
tion of a limited partnership. The court in Fraser treated a limited liability company the same
as a corporation for the purpose of assessing the single entity immunity. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
This article will treat a limited liability company in the same manner.
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munity, the plaintiffs asserted that MLS is a "sham" corporation and
therefore not entitled to single entity immunity.
Because the sham exception aspect of the Fraser decision could have
significant ramifications for antitrust law well beyond sports leagues, this
article will focus on the plaintiffs' claim in Fraser that MLS is a sham
corporation unqualified for single entity immunity.7 Despite the Fraser
court's scant analysis of the sham corporation argument, the limited use
of a sham exception in single entity immunity cases can be reasonable
and necessary. In fact, the use of the sham exception in single entity
cases would conform in many ways with the use of the sham exception as
applied to the petitioning immunity established in Eastern Railroad Pres-
idents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.8 (Noerr). Initially, this
article will discuss the facts, decision, and legal analysis by the court in
the Fraser case as they relate to the single entity immunity established in
Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporation.9 Then, the
role of the sham exception as it relates to the single entity immunity will
be compared to the sham exception as it applies in the Noerr context.
I. BACKGROUND
Section one of the Sherman Act states that "every contract, combina-
tion... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade... is declared to be illegal." 1"
In Copperweld, the Supreme Court decided that because a contract,
combination, or conspiracy requires more than one party, a single entity
is immune from prosecution under section one for its "anticompetitive"
acts taken alone because an entity cannot conspire with itself.11 In par-
ticular, the Court in Copperweld found that a formal corporate legal dis-
tinction between a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
can be ignored when dealing with Sherman Act section one claims.12
7. Judge O'Toole's opinion is structured in a very odd way. The natural construction
would be to address first whether the corporation has single entity immunity (including the
application of the sham exception). Then, once the single entity immunity has been estab-
lished, such a natural construction would examine whether the interests and activities of the
investors show a variance from the now valid corporation such that the investors have gone
beyond the bounds of a single entity. Instead, Judge O'Toole analyzes the "independent per-
sonal stake exception" claim first, and then the sham exception. See generally Fraser, 97 F.
Supp. 2d 130. The rationale for this approach is far from clear.
8. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
9. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1. As against the need for two parties to be acting under section one,
section two of the Sherman Act declares unitary acts by a dominant entity illegal when these
acts constitute monopolization or attempted monopolization. Id. § 2.
11. 467 U.S. at 769-71.
12. Id. at 771-74.
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The Court applied an economic reality test and accepted that there was a
sufficient economic unity of interests for these related corporations to be
treated as a single entity.'3
Since the Copperweld decision, various professional sports leagues,
which are each a collection of separate team owners acting under a
sports league banner, have tried to claim that they constitute a single
entity when faced with antitrust litigation.'4 In response to these claims,
courts have developed a series of factors to examine in determining
whether such a sports league is a single entity or a collection of separate
entities. 15 Aware of these decisions, MLS tried to construct a corporate
structure that met both the factors noted by the courts in the sports
league cases that might establish a single entity immunity, as well as
form a limited liability company that included the common and self-in-
terests of the "competitor" investors.' 6 The Fraser court did not address
13. Id.
14. The claims by these sports leagues were usually denied. See generally Sullivan v. Na-
tional Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995); Chi-
cago Prof'l Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Assoc., 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996); United
States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 887
F.2d (2d Cir. N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). But
see Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Seabury Mgmt. v. Professional Golfers'
Ass'n of Am., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994). In a non-sports context, see Okansen v.
Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992); City of
Mount Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Corp., Inc., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988).
15. The Ninth Circuit rejected the NFL's single entity claim. The court provided several
factors that should be examined when faced with such an alleged single entity. Does the
league function, corporately and economically, as a unified entity or separately from the team
owners? Do the teams operate as separate business entities whose products have an indepen-
dent ownership and/or value? Assessing the degree of revenue sharing among the teams of
the league, who sets the policies for the teams and the league - the league itself, the teams
acting jointly or each team for itself? Do the teams compete "off-the-field," e.g., for players,
coaches and management personnel? Where there are two or more teams, do the teams com-
pete for fan support and media coverage in the geographic region? L.A. Mem'l Coliseum
Comm'n., 348 F.2d at 1388-90. The First Circuit added off-the-field competition for the sale of
ownership interests as an additional factor. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099.
16. Chicago Profl Sports, Ltd, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996). The court in the Chicago
Prof'l Sports, Ltd. case indicated that a business arrangement might be deemed a single entity
when it engages in some activities and a joint venture when it participates in other activities.
Further, divergent interests would not preclude a finding that, for certain activities, the
franchises could function as a single enterprise. Id. at 598-600. The Seventh Circuit concluded
that the reasoning in Copperweld dictated no single universal characterization of sports
leagues and instead might require the question of status to be determined "one league at a
time - and perhaps one facet of a league at a time." Id. at 600. Therefore, the NBA could be
"one firm when selling broadcast rights to a network in competition with a thousand other
producers of entertainment, but is best understood as a joint venture when curtailing competi-
tion for players who have few other market opportunities." Id.
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whether MLS could qualify as a "single entity" under the factors set
forth in the cases where pre-existing corporations and other entities
joined together under a "league" corporate umbrella while also continu-
ing their separate existence. Instead, the Fraser court found that MLS is
immune from section one of the Sherman Act because it is a limited
liability company. 17 However, in order to determine whether the elec-
tion to put the whole league into a single corporation in itself qualifies
for single entity immunity, it is essential to assess whether and to what
extent there is a sham exception prior to a finding of single entity
immunity.
II. THE CASE OF FRASER V. MLS
A. The Facts
MLS (a representative defendant) was formed in Delaware as a lim-
ited liability company (MLS, L.L.C.) in 1994 and is owned by a set of
investor-operators of the teams in the MLS soccer league and some pas-
sive investors."i Although the structure and operation of MLS appears
to be consistent with a properly functioning limited liability company,
the plaintiffs have asserted that in reality MLS, L.L.C., in both its struc-
ture and operation, functions more like an amalgamation of interested
investor-operators hiding behind a screen of corporate formality. 9 The
individual plaintiffs in Fraser are the representatives of [a] certified class
of professional soccer players who are or who have been employed by
... [MLS] .' 20 Among the several antitrust claims asserted by the plain-
tiffs are two allegations that "MLS and several of its owner-investors...
[had] unlawfully combined to restrain trade.., in violation of [section] 1
of the Sherman [ ] Act .... "21 First, "by contracting for player services
centrally, through MLS, [the defendants] effectively eliminat[ed] the
competition for those [players'] services that would have taken place if
17. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
18. The defendants in this case included MLS, L.L.C., United States Soccer Federation,
and many of the investor-operators of the teams in MLS. None of the passive investors were
defendants in Fraser. Id. at 131.
19. On the surface, MLS is operated like a fully functioning "corporate" business entity.
The structure and mode of operation of MLS is governed by its Limited Liability Company
Agreement. The MLS Agreement establishes a Management Committee consisting of repre-
sentatives of each of the investor-operators. Id. at 132-33. The Management Committee has
authority to manage the business and affairs of MLS. However, as the plaintiffs assert, the
reality may vary significantly from the appearance. Id. at 136-38.
20. Id. at 131.
21. Id.
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each MLS team were free to bid for and sign players directly."'22 Second,
"the defendants ... conspired to impose anti-competitive 'transfer fees'
on player relocation that have the effect of restricting the ability of soc-
cer players to move from one team to another, thus dampening competi-
tion for players' services worldwide. 3
The defendants moved for summary judgment claiming that MLS is a
single entity and therefore could not commit, unilaterally, a violation of
section one of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment as to the defendants' single entity immunity claim. The gist of
the plaintiffs' argument was that, although MLS appears to be a properly
formed Delaware L.L.C., the corporate organizational form is really a
sham.24 Therefore, MLS should not be allowed to use the single entity
immunity to insulate the defendants from condemnation for concerted
"illegal horizontal restraints on the hiring of players."'
B. Judge O'Toole's Opinion
The plaintiffs claimed in their primary argument addressing § one
that the corporate structure of MLS is a "sham designed to allow what is
actually an illegal combination of plural actors to masquerade" as a sin-
gle business entity.26 They asserted that the economic reality test used in
Copperweld should also be used to determine whether a corporation has
sufficient "corporateness" to be treated as a single entity and thus avoid
liability under section one.27 In effect, the plaintiffs argued that al-
22. Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 131.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 131-32.
25. Id. at 132. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that if the corporation is insulated from
section one as a single entity, the investor-operators have such "independent personal stakes"
that those interests constitute an exception to the single entity immunity and, thus, permit suit
against those investor-shareholders for a violation of section one. Id. at 136. Despite the
plaintiffs' assertions of the factual foundations that support the application of the personal
stake exception, Judge O'Toole stated that the independent personal stake exception has not
been squarely addressed in his circuit (First Circuit) and expressed fears about a broad appli-
cation of the exception. "[R]ecognizing the risk that this exception, if left unchecked, might
swallow the rule, courts that employ it have done so conservatively." Id. at 135. After weigh-
ing the evidence, Judge O'Toole concluded that despite some competing interests the MLS's
owner-operators consistently met the "unity of interests" test of the corporation rather than
the self-interest necessary to apply the independent personal stake exception. Id. at 139.
26. Id. at 137-38.
27. Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 138. It is clear that Judge O'Toole understood the plaintiffs'
argument "that the structure of MLS is a sham designed to allow what is actually an illegal
combination of plural actors to masquerade as the business conduct of a single entity." Id. at
137-38. He paraphrases the plaintiffs' claim as ". . .even if MLS is a legitimate LLC [for
Delaware corporations law purposes,] ... a court should disregard that legal form in evaluat-
2001]
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though MLS appears to be a properly formed and operating Delaware
L.L.C., the plan for MLS's formation and the activities within that "legal
person" after "incorporation" reveal distinctions that would be more ac-
curately described as a product of a collection of competitors, when put
to the "economic reality" test used in Copperweld. Thus, the plaintiffs
argued that the court should disregard the legal form in evaluating
whether the operator-investors are engaged in horizontal anti-competi-
tive practices.28
The court in Fraser rejected the plaintiffs' sham argument as a failed
attempt to "put a reverse spin on the Copperweld holding. '29 Although
it conceded that the plaintiffs' economic reality argument had some su-
perficial appeal, it concluded that, on "close[r] examination[, the plain-
tiffs' argument rested] on a misconception of the scope of the
Copperweld principle."30  The court found that MLS was properly
formed, and that MLS continues to operate as an L.L.C. under Dela-
ware's corporation law. Therefore, MLS was a single entity, immune
from section one of the Sherman Act.31
In Copperweld, the Supreme Court ignored the corporate law distinc-
tion between a parent corporation and its separately incorporated,
wholly owned subsidiary and declared them an economic unit for anti-
trust law purposes.32 The Fraser court's conclusion implies that it inter-
preted Copperweld to readopt the principles of the law of corporations
as primary once Copperweld's subsidiary was inside the economically
unitary corporate structure.33 While this may make factual sense when
looking at the corporations involved in Copperweld, the facts and issues
alleged in Fraser, if correct, are inapposite to Copperweld.34 As the Fra-
ser court conceded, Copperweld and its progeny have focused on
ing under antitrust principles whether the operator-investors are engaged in a horizontal re-
straint in the market for players' services." Id. at 138.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 139.
32. Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 138-39.
33. Id.
34. Copperweld involved a fully functioning parent corporation and a separate, fully func-
tioning subsidiary. The Court in Copperweld understood that it was dealing with two corpora-
tions that were parts of a whole, under the control of the parent. 467 U.S. at 771-73.
Conversely, in Fraser, MLS has not yet established that it is functioning effectively as a corpo-
ration. Indeed, the plaintiffs have alleged that MLS is in effect a "sham" corporation. Despite
this allegation, Judge O'Toole refused to review or analyze MLS's corporate operations.
Rather, he only reviewed the corporate documents (e.g., Bylaws) and accepted MLS as a fully
functioning corporation. In fact, he excused his lack of exploration. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
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whether to disregard corporation law distinctions between entities, due
to their inter-corporate relationships, in order to find economic singular-
ity for the purposes of Sherman Act.35 But, the Court, in Copperweld,
never endorsed an all-but-hollow shell of a corporate form to be suffi-
cient as a single entity, immune from application of section one of the
Sherman Act. In fact, the Court's discussion in Copperweld might raise
the opposite impression.36
Despite the significant gap between the solidity of the corporations in
Copperweld and the allegations of sham incorporation in Fraser, the Fra-
ser court applied the law of corporations to the plaintiffs' claims without
considering the antitrust context. For example, the court measured
whether MLS, L.L.C. had violated its corporate structure by references
to piercing the corporate veil.37 The court in Fraser asserts that "Cop-
perweld does not support the proposition that a business organized as a
single legal entity should have its form ignored, or its 'veil' pierced, so
that courts could examine whether participants in the firm have con-
ducted concerted activity that would violate § 1."31 Indeed, Judge
O'Toole seemed to fear that an examination "would permit the atomiza-
tion of firms into their constituent parts, [and] then.., have the relation-
ships of those parts examined to see if they produced anticompetitive
effects that, had they been brought about by independent economic ac-
tors, would have violated §1.... No case has suggested that it would be
appropriate to deconstruct a corporate entity in that way."39 However,
the Fraser court's conclusion that it would be inappropriate to open up a
corporation to examine whether it, in fact, is operating in a manner con-
sistent with the antitrust laws also has no case support. Copperweld had
nothing to do with piercing the corporate veil (unless one considers ig-
noring the independent corporate status of the two corporations as
piercing the corporate veil).40 Indeed, the issue of sham incorporation,
as raised in Fraser, is unique.
To determine whether the claims made by the plaintiffs in Fraser are
valid, the court must be willing to consider the purposes of the antitrust
laws as against those of the corporation laws. To wit, despite compliance
with the incorporation laws and superficial conformity with the corpo-
rate formalities, is the corporation a sham because its real purpose is to
35. Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 138.
36. Cf infra § III, 4.
37. Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See generally Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752.
2001]
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accomplish anti-competitive acts under an emperor's new clothes, corpo-
rate formality?
First, there must be a determination as to whether a single entity im-
munity shield is automatically presumed upon incorporation or whether
the corporation must first pass a "sham" test to qualify for the shield.
Further, if the immunity shield is automatic, then the issue remains as to
what must be shown by the plaintiffs to overcome the shield.4" Although
the evidence necessary to prove sham incorporation may be the same,
whether the immunity shield is automatic or not, the erection of an im-
munity shield shifts the burden from the defendant, who must establish a
single entity immunity, to the plaintiff, who must disprove the appropri-
ateness of that shield. Modern courts have accepted that a business en-
tity should receive a limited liability shield for corporate law purposes
(barring defective incorporation - which is not present here) upon sub-
mission of the filing of incorporation papers with the state of the incor-
poration. However, some cases point to the possibility that the limited
liability shield should not be recognized where the incorporation has
been done to avoid a "clear legislative purpose."'4 2 It would seem that
antitrust law would fit as a clear legislative purpose. Further, Delaware
corporation law permits a "judicial inquiry into ... lawful possession of
any corporate power [a putative corporation] may assert in any other
suit or proceeding where its corporate existence or the power to exercise
the corporate rights it asserts [are] challenged, and [any] evidence tend-
ing to sustain the challenge shall be admissible in any such suit or
proceeding."43
41. If the single entity immunity shield is recognized automatically upon incorporation,
there can be procedural piercing, i.e., for a sham corporation, or substantive piercing, i.e., the
"independent personal stake" exception. The factors to be considered in addressing the sub-
stantive piercing of the corporate veil issue, the "independent personal stake" exception, ad-
dress whether the shield created upon incorporation has been disregarded in practice by those
within the corporation. This "piercing" standard is appropriate to examine the disregard of
the corporate entity through antitrust activities by the directors, officers, or shareholders that
vary significantly from the interests of the functioning corporate entity.
42. Schenley Distillers. Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946). Still, the corpo-
rate entity "will not be disregarded where those in control have deliberately adopted the cor-
porate form in order to secure its advantages and where no violence to the legislative purpose
is done by treating the corporate entity as a separate legal person." Id. See also Kavanaugh v.
Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1965) ("[T]he Dealers' Day in Court Act would be
subverted ... if the corporate format adopted by the parties were given recognition. Hence,
we must 'pierce the veil' of the corporate entity and look to the substance and reality of the
situation. In the interest of justice, the corporate fiction must be ignored.").
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 329 (1991).
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In effect, the court in Fraser has declared that incorporation under
the corporation law trumps antitrust law. Yet, there is no support in
antitrust law for artificially expanding the gap between sections one and
two of the Sherman Act so that corporate form automatically overcomes
economic reality.' Indeed, Copperweld did not discuss, much less ap-
prove, legitimizing, for antitrust purposes, all activity performed by a
corporate entity, solely because it meets the quite relaxed standards of
incorporation law. If formal incorporation can become a shield against
antitrust challenges under section one of the Sherman Act, current or
newly developing potential competitors can incorporate as one unit to
coordinate their common interests and implement otherwise illegal ac-
tivities in labor negotiations, vendor contracts, vertical price-fixing, and
non-price practices. By skillful drafting of the corporate documents,
these competitors could form a corporation that could coordinate hiring
practices and divide markets in ways that would otherwise constitute per
se horizontal antitrust violations. Judge O'Toole's treatment of the
"sham" argument in Fraser seems to imply that he did not contemplate,
much less address, the grand implications of his analysis and conclusions.
Copperweld clearly recognizes that a parent and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary should be treated as a single entity for purposes of the antitrust
laws.45 However, the Copperweld Court never commented upon "sham"
corporations that appear to be a functioning single entity, but are, in
actuality, created solely to circumvent the antitrust laws.46
III. THE SHAM EXCEPTION
The concept of "sham" in antitrust law has been applied most promi-
nently as an "exception" to the immunity from the antitrust laws recog-
nized in the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine (Noerr doctrine).47 The Noerr
doctrine arose in response to efforts to influence the government, which,
if successful, would have anticompetitive effects. The Noerr doctrine line
of cases has established the general rule that lobbying, and other efforts
to obtain legislative or executive action, "do not violate the antitrust
laws, even when those efforts are intended to eliminate [the] competi-
44. See infra § III B, 7.
45. Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 138.
46. See generally Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752.
47. The cases that make up the foundation of the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine are: Cal.
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), affd in part, reversed in part, 400 F.2d 806 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968); Noerr, 365 U.S. 127.
2001]
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tion or otherwise restrain trade" (Noerr immunity).4 8 This immunity was
subsequently extended beyond legislative and executive action to judi-
cial and quasi-judicial bodies.49 The Supreme Court in Noerr excepted
(in dicta) from Noerr immunity petitioning activity that is a mere "sham"
used not to gain government action, but to cloak direct interference with
the business of a competitor.5" In effect, the sham exception recognizes
that some petitioning is used solely to obfuscate and thereby thwart
other parties. The Noerr Court conceded that such petitioning does not
warrant immunity. 1
The Supreme Court announced more specific standards for petition-
ing legislative and administrative bodies in City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc.52 The Court in Omni noted that "the sham
exception encompasses situations in which persons use the governmental
process - as opposed to the outcome of that process - as an anti-compet-
itive weapon." 53 The Omni Court cited its decision in Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.54 for the principle that sham conduct
"involves a defendant whose activities are 'not genuinely aimed at pro-
curing favorable government action' at all."55
A substantial parallel can be drawn between the Noerr immunity and
the single entity immunity recognized in Copperweld. First, the rationale
48. JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., 3 ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATIONS
§ 47.04, at 47-25 (2d ed. 2001). See generally Noerr, 365 U.S. 127; Pennington, 381 U.S. 657.
49. See generally Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. 508.
50. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144
51. Id. See also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 381 (1991).
However, the Supreme Court has suggested that the protection that the First Amendment
affords to petitioning activity, before courts and administrative tribunals, was less robust than
the protections applicable to petitions addressed to executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment. But see Cal. Motor Transp. 404 U.S. at 512-513.
52. 499 U.S. 365.
53. Id. at 380 (emphasis omitted).
54. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
55. Omni Outdoor Adver. Inc., 499 U.S. at 380 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit, 486 U.S. at
500 n.4). A few years later, the Court set a more specific standard for adjudication activity in
Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). In Profl
Real Estate Investors, Inc. the Court set out a two-part definition of sham litigation that
adopted a hybrid objective-subjective test. First, the lawsuit must be "objectively baseless."
Id. at 60-61. If an objective, reasonable, litigant could realistically expect a favorable outcome
of the suit on the merits, then the suit is entitled to Noerr immunity. Id. at 63. If, on the other
hand, the challenged suit is objectively baseless, the court must then examine the subjective
motivation of the party bringing the questioned suit to determine whether the "baseless law-
suit [constitutes] 'an attempt to interfere directly' with a competitor's business by using 'the
governmental process[, rather than] the outcome of that process[,] as an anticompetitive
weapon." Id. at 60-61 (quoting Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. at 380 (emphasis
omitted)).
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for the immunities in Noerr and Copperweld are similar. The Noerr im-
munity was provided to shield from antitrust liability petitioning of the
government, whatever its goal. Thus, the fact that the petitioning re-
sulted in a less competitive marketplace was ixrelevant. Similarly, in
Copperweld, the Court immunized from section one of the Sherman Act,
coordinated corporate action by throwing a broad net over a parent and
wholly owned subsidiary corporate structure (even ignoring corporate
law distinctions recognized in other areas of the law, e.g., tax) and de-
claring it a single entity for antitrust purposes.5 6 However, mistakenly
relying on Copperweld, the court in Fraser accepted that compliance
with the minimal standards for the formation of a Delaware L.L.C. also
warranted qualification for single entity immunity. 7 Thereafter, the
court entertained only corporation law standards to assess the legality of
the single entity, e.g. defective incorporation and piercing the corporate
veil." The court in Fraser failed to consider the existence of, much less
the standards for, a sham exception to the single entity immunity for
antitrust purposes. However, as in Noerr, the Copperweld single entity
immunity must be limited by a sham exception to prevent the use of a
governmental sanctioning process, incorporation, as an anticompetitive
weapon that will be used solely, or primarily, as an artifice to evade the
antitrust laws, rather than as a way to create a real corporation.
Second, the Sherman Act's limitations are a significant part of the
basis for the immunities, in both Noerr and Copperweld. In Noerr, Jus-
tice Black noted that the Court acted not on First Amendment grounds,
but because "no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon
mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws."59 Like
Noerr, the Court in Copperweld recognized that Congress did not intend
to apply section one of the Sherman Act to certain activities, here, those
of a corporate family;60 and thus, the single entity immunity was born.
However, unlike Noerr, the Copperweld Court never addressed the pos-
sibility of the creation of a corporation solely to gain the single entity
shield by the de minimus formalistic requirements of incorporation law
56. 467 U.S. at 776-77.
57. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 134-135.
58. Id. at 138-139.
59. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135. Courts have identified several bases for the Noerr doctrine's
antitrust immunity. Among these bases have been, the First Amendment right of citizens to
petition their government. See, e.g., California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 510; Bill John-
son's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). For a statutory interpretation of the
Sherman Act under which Congress is viewed as not intending the Act to reach governmental
action or the political process, see Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. at 380.
60. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768-69.
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today. Yet, where this practice occurs, it is essential that a court be able
to prevent form from overtaking substance by stripping the immunity
through a sham exception.
Finally, the sham exception creates an extremely small but essential
opening in the immunity shield. Of necessity, the courts must have a
mechanism to prevent abuse of the section one immunity. Thus, the
Copperweld Court stated that the focus of section one "on concerted
behavior leaves a 'gap' in the [Sherman] Act's proscription against un-
reasonable restraints of trade."'" The Court also noted that the size of
the gap between Sherman Act sections one and two is "open to serious
question."62 Indeed, Copperweld cites examples of factual situations
that would close the entry to single entity immunity. The Court notes,
"[i]t has long been clear that a pattern of acquisitions may itself create a
combination illegal under § 1, especially when an original anticompeti-
tive purpose is evident from the affiliated corporations' subsequent con-
duct."63 The Copperweld Court also cites Northern Securities Co. v.
United States64 to express the limitations in the formation of the com-
pany in the Copperweld context. "All the stock [a railroad holding com-
pany] held or acquired in the constituent companies was acquired and
held to be used in suppressing competition between those companies. It
came into existence only for that purpose."65 Further, interpreting the
decision of United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,66 the Copperweld Court
notes that the "affiliation of the defendants was irrelevant because [the]
original acquisitions were themselves illegal. An affiliation 'flowing from
an illegal conspiracy' would not avert sanctions. Common ownership
and control were irrelevant because the restraint of trade was 'the pri-
mary object of the combination' which was created in a 'deliberate, cal-
culated manner.'"67 In Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy,68 the
Copperweld immunity was held not to apply where individual defend-
ants conspired before the formation of the corporation and the corpora-
tion "was merely the instrumentality through which the objects of the
61. Id. at 774-75.
62. Id. at 776-77.
63. Id. at 761.
64. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
65. Id. at 354. The Copperweld Court also cites for this principle, Standard Oil Co. of N.J.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911).
66. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
67. 467 U.S. at 761-62 (citing Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218).
68. 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 67, 316 (D. S.C. 1986).
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conspiracy would be achieved. ' 69 Although these cases relate to a col-
lection of existing corporations "merging" into a single entity, these
cases clearly show the Court's concern that the entry way to becoming a
single entity must be guarded. "A corporation's initial acquisition of
control will always be subject to scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act
and § 7 of the Clayton Act.... 70
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts facing antitrust issues in the sports business context must con-
template the ramifications of their decisions well beyond the world of
sports business. In Fraser, the district court was faced with the claim of a
sham exception to the single entity immunity recognized in Copperweld.
Rather than address this novel issue, Judge O'Toole, once he saw an
incorporation, retreated to the application of the corporation laws and
applied an absolute immunity from the antitrust laws for what he saw as
a legitimate single entity. Whether or not the facts in Fraser warrant the
application of a sham exception, consideration of a sham exception, and
the antitrust reasoning behind it, is essential to assure that false corpo-
rate fronts do not become automatic shields against antitrust enforce-
ment. The ramifications of the decision in Fraser will reach far beyond
"sports" leagues and sports law. Unless reversed by the First Circuit,
this decision will affect the nature of antitrust planning throughout the
business community and create immunity shields for some competitors
who otherwise would be appropriately subject to section one of the
Sherman Act.
69. Id. at 61, 63. See also Rio Vista Oil, Ltd. v. Southland Corp., 667 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D.
Utah 1987).
70. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777.
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